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Abstract—The use of Ring Oscillator PUFs to provide circuit 
authentication is analyzed in this paper. The limitations of the 
previously reported approach in terms of false rejection (due to 
high intra-die variations) and false acceptance (due to small 
inter-die variations) are discussed. These limitations are 
overcome by a new proposal that does not increase considerably 
hardware complexity and, besides, provides lower power 
consumption and/or higher speed to achieve high security 
requirements. All these issues are illustrated with experimental 
results obtained with FPGAs from Xilinx. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, it is needed to authenticate not only the person 
that uses a device (using secret keys, passwords, etc.) but also 
the device itself. This means that both the software and 
hardware of the device (its circuitry) should be authentic. 
Circuit authentication consists in verifying the trustworthiness 
of the hardware. This is becoming so important that design-
for-trust challenges are being defined (similarly to design-for-
test challenges) [1]. The concept of authentication means a 1 
to 1 validation, that is, a verifier validates that the circuit is 
which it claims to be. Similarly, circuit identification is a 1 to 
N validation process because, in this case, a verifier identifies 
which, out of the N possible circuits, the circuit is. Both 
procedures require a pre-verification stage usually called 
“enrollment” in which the unique and distinctive features (also 
called “template”) of the circuit have to be stored. In the case 
of authentication, only the template of the circuit to be 
authenticated must be stored while in the case of identification 
the N templates must be recorded. In any case, the key point is 
to obtain a good template that allows distinguishing an 
authentic circuit from a fake one (impostor). A usual solution 
is to employ a template consisting in a digital number, also 
known as identification number or ID number [2]-[3]. 
Silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been 
proposed as a cost-effective way to produce identifiers that 
exploit the random variability of the circuit fabrication process 
[5]. Exploiting the power consumption variability in different 
realizations of the same circuit, leakage-based PUFs have 
been proposed [2]. The different leakage current consumption 
of each circuit, which is an analog number, is translated into a 
digital ID number. However, such translation is complex and 
requires a cost both in hardware as in power consumption, 
which may modify the ID itself.  Memory-based PUFs such as 
SRAM and butterfly PUFs are based in the different start-up 
values of cross-coupled circuits [4]. The use of memory-based 
(cross-coupled NOR gates) PUFs for ID creation is described 
in [3]. This solution is very efficient in terms of readout speed 
and power consumption, but suffers from the lack of 
reliability, which can be improved by increasing the length of 
the ID, making a long number of readouts to reduce the noise, 
or increasing the signal to noise ratio of the circuit evaluation 
process. The delay variability in different physical realizations 
of the same circuit is exploited by arbiter and ring oscillator 
(RO) PUFs [6]. The basis for using these delay-based PUFs 
for circuit authentication is presented in [6]. In particular, the 
use of ring oscillator (RO) PUFs is receiving attention for its 
simplicity, reliability, and uniqueness [7]. Its main drawbacks 
are power consumption and dependability on, mainly, power 
supply variations [3], [8]. 
This paper proposes a new method to provide circuit 
authentication based on RO PUFs reducing the problems of 
power consumption and power supply variations. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section II reviews the basic RO PUF 
scheme employed for hardware authentication and illustrates 
its limitations with experimental results obtained with Spartan 
3 FPGAs from Xilinx. Section III presents a new approach 
that provides better performance for authentication. This is 
also illustrated with experimental results. Finally, conclusions 
are given in Section IV. 
II. USING RO PUFS FOR AUTHENTICATION 
A. Basic RO PUF structure 
Fig. 1 illustrates the delay PUF based on Ring Oscillators 
firstly proposed by Su et al. in [6]. The structure is composed 
of a group of identically laid-out ring oscillators.  This way, 
the slight difference frequency of each ring oscillator is due to 
manufacturing variation of the physical device where the PUF 
is included. The procedure to obtain bit strings from these 
elements is to compare the frequencies between pairs of ring 
oscillators. The output bits from the same sequence of 
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oscillator pair comparisons will vary from chip to chip. The 
circuit determines the difference between frequencies by using 
two counters that measure the number of oscillations along 
some fixed amount of time. The counter that counts higher 
amount of periods corresponds to the ring oscillator with 
higher frequency. In order to determine the output of the PUF 
structure, a comparator is placed after the counters, in such a 
way that the resultant bit is ‘1’ if the upper oscillator in the 
floorplan has higher frequency than the lower one, and ‘0’ in 
other case. If n pairs are compared the bit string (ID number) 
obtained has n bits. 
The ID number generated in the authentication stage is 
compared with the template stored in the enrollment stage. 
Since they are digital numbers, such comparison is performed 
by calculating the Hamming Distance (HD). In order to allow 
certain tolerance, a threshold is usually defined, so that, if the 
difference is below or equal to the threshold, the circuit is 
authenticated while otherwise it is considered as impostor. A 
measure to determine the quality of an authentication process 
is to evaluate the values of the False Acceptation Rate (FAR) 
and False Rejection Rate (FRR). The ideal situation is to find 
a threshold so that both FAR and FRR are zero. In the one 
side, the ideal situation is that the ID number generated by the 
PUF is always the same (the PUF is completely reliable). 
Hence, the threshold can be selected as zero and a circuit is 
rejected if the HD with the template is bigger than zero. 
However, the PUF is not completely reliable. Such reliability 
is measured by the average of intra-die HD, as follows (being 
x the number of samples): 
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Due to noise, temperature or power supply variations, the 
same pair of oscillators in the same device may output the 
opposite value in the authentication stage to that registered in 
the enrollment stage (‘1’ instead of ‘0’ or vice versa). This 
problem, known as bit flipping, causes that the intra-die 
distance increases, so that a threshold of zero cannot be 
selected because the FRR could be large. 
In the other side, the ideal situation is that the ID numbers 
generated by different circuits are very much different (the 
PUF achieves uniqueness). Such uniqueness is measured by 
the average of inter-die HD, as follows (being m the number 
of circuits compared): 
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The model used in [7] to analyze the total delay in a ring 
oscillator (which determines the behavior of the ring oscillator 
PUF) is the following: 
          RO AVG PV noised d d d    (3) 
 
The delay dAVG is the nominal delay of the ring oscillator, 
which depends on its components (more or less inverters, 
gates, etc.) and how they are distributed and interconnected. It 
is the same for all identically laid-out oscillators. The delay dPV 
is due to process variation. It may vary from one oscillator to 
other but it is static, that is, it is assumed to be constant over 
time in a given physical realization (neglecting possible 
ageing effects). The delay dnoise represents a noisy and dynamic 
component that changes over time. The effect of noise can be 
removed by counting a big number of intervals because the 
media of the noise is assumed to be zero. Hence, if noise is 
removed and identical oscillators are compared, the 
differences in frequencies only depend on the fabrication 
process of the chip that includes the PUF. Assuming that 
variations in the fabrication process are random, this means 
that the average inter-die HD is ideally 50%. 
However, the response of the Ring Oscillator PUF depends 
on the rest of the circuitry in the system, as described in [8]. 
This is mainly caused by the sensitivity of oscillation 
frequency to power supply variations within the chip. Hence 
the model in (3) should be refined as follows (neglecting 
noise): 
 RO AVG PV SYSTEMd d d d    (4) 
 
Due to the influence of the system, it is quite common that 
responses of the PUF in different devices show bit aliasing, 
that is, there are bits in the ID numbers of different devices 
that always take the same value. The consequence of this 
phenomenon is a decrement in the value of the average inter-
die distance. The problem is that if the inter-die distance 
decreases and the intra-die distance increases, the 
authentication process can fail, as illustrated in the following.
  
B. Experimental Results 
In order to obtain the FAR and FRR curves and the 
distribution of the genuine and fake population for the basic 
scheme of RO-based authentication described above, a sort of 
measurements have been performed. A PUF made with a 
matrix of 32 identical Ring Oscillators has been implemented 
into a sort of XC3S200 Spartan 3 FPGAs from Xilinx. The 
matrix has been placed in the center of the device, with the 
oscillators placed as close as possible from each other in order 
to avoid deterministic gradients in the variations of the 
fabrication process. Each ring oscillator has 4 inverters and 1 
NAND gate that serves to enable it. It occupies one CLB 
(Configurable Logic Block), with the same occupation of 
slices (the placement is controlled by the synthesis) so as to 
ensure identical oscillators. The frequency of the enabled 
oscillator is measured by comparing the results of its 
associated counter with the count of a reference counter 
working at the board frequency of 50 MHz. The counter 
 
Figure 1.  Ring Oscillator PUF presented in [6]. 
associated to the oscillators has 32 bits. It is stopped when the 
reference counter counts 215 system clock cycles, what makes 
a total of 65.53 ms. The reason for using this long count time 
is to ensure noise removal so as to evaluate frequency changes 
due only to variations in the fabrications process.  
Since the PUF behavior depends on the system where it is 
included, the PUF has not been studied alone (as reported in 
other works) but has been analyzed inside a whole security 
system, similar to that described in [9]. The system contains 
the PUF structure, a pseudo-random number generator of 32 
bits based on non-linear feedback shift registers, and a short 
version of Keccak [b=400] sponge hash function with line 
width of 8 bits and 18 rounds [10]. In order to avoid the 
possible influences of changes in the system, a unique bit 
stream has been generated from the VHDL code of the whole 
system. This has been done using ISE environment provided 
by Xilinx. The objective is to measure only the possible 
variations due to the fabrication process. The same bit stream 
has been loaded into 8 different FPGAs and the output values 
of the counters that measure the frequencies of the 32 
oscillators have been recorded 8 times for each FPGA.  
From each matrix of 32 oscillators, an ID number with 28 
bits is obtained because 28 comparisons are performed. This 
ID is compared with the rest of IDs obtained from other 
measurements of the same FPGA (intra-die data) and from 
other FPGAs (inter-die data). The comparisons performed 
have been the following:  
 Intra-die data: The amount of intra-die 
comparisons for each device is 28. This is the 
number of different pairs that can be formed with 
8 measurements of each device. As they are 8 
devices, the genuine population of the 
authentication process is formed by 8*28=224 
samples. 
 Inter-die data: Each measurement of each device 
is compared with the 8 samples of the rest of the 
devices (64 comparisons between a pair of 
devices). Since 28 different pairs can be 
considered, the resulting comparisons form a 
population of 64*28=1792 samples. This forms 
the impostor population. 
Fig. 2 shows the Hamming Distance with their templates 
of the genuine and impostor populations. The average intra-
die HD is 2.5% instead of 0% while the average inter-die HD 
is 30.62% instead of 50%. The maximum value of the intra-
die HD is 14.29% while the minimum value of the inter-die 
HD is 10.71 %. Hence, as there is overlapping between both 
populations, there would be always a small probability of error 
in the authentication whatever the threshold is chosen. This 
effect appears clearly represented in Fig. 3. The FAR and FRR 
overlap showing the same value (EER, equal error rate) of 
0.45% for a threshold of 14.2%. Such EER value can vary 
from 0.45% to 2% easily if there are variations in the power 
supply, temperature, etc. 
The usual practice to avoid this problem is to employ more 
ring oscillators to obtain more bits (64, 128, and 256 ring 
oscillators are employed in [7]). The problem of such solution 
is the increase in power consumption. Using the Xilinx 
Xpower tool provided in the ISE environment, each oscillator 
shows a power consumption of around 20 µW. Another 
drawback can be the time needed to generate the ID number 
(which increases with the number of oscillators if bits are 
generated serially). Hence, the generation of a large ID 
number could be power hungry, noisy, slow, and possibly 
more vulnerable to side channel attacks. To avoid such 
problems, the novel proposal discussed in the following is not 
to employ more oscillator pairs but more bits per pair. 
III. A NOVEL RO PUF-BASED AUTHENTICATION 
The approach described above codifies the frequency 
difference between two oscillators with just one bit, because 
it is only codified the sign of such difference. A drawback of 
such coarse quantization is, for example, bit aliasing: 
variations in the fabrication process can be masked by the 
influence of the surrounding elements to the PUF. Such 
influence produces variations in the Vdd that feeds the 
oscillators in such a way that one of the oscillators in the pair 
can be always faster than the other in all the devices [8]. The 
novel scheme proposed herein is to use the complete 
resolution of the frequency difference measurement. By using 
more bits of the counter that counts oscillations, better 
discrimination between devices can be obtained. In other 
words, the authentication is improved by using an adder-
subtractor instead of a comparator to measure the frequency 
difference between oscillator pairs. 
If the counter associated with a ring oscillator counts 
osc_count oscillations during the 215 clock cycles of the 
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Figure 3.  Genuine (in blue) and impostor (in red)  populations 
distributed versus the Hamming Distance with their templates 
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Figure 2.  FAR and FRR traditional approach 
reference counter, the frequency of the ring oscillator, 
frec_RO, can be calculated as follows: 
         
15
50_ _ *
2
MHzfrec RO osc count  (5) 
Subtracting two counts (osc_count_A and osc_count_B), 
the frequency difference between two oscillators (diff) can be 
measured as follows: 
15
50( _ _ _ _ )*
2
MHzdiff osc count A osc count B   (6) 
These measurements have been evaluated with the same 
FPGA samples described in the previous section. The 
maximum value of diff_frec obtained for all the pairs has been 
15.6 MHz. This means that: 
15
max
15.6*2( _ _ _ _ )
50
osc count A osc count B   (7) 
Hence, 14 bits are enough to codify each diff. Considering, 
as in the previous section, 28 oscillator pairs, the ID number 
now has 28*14=392 bits (which means a template size of 49 
bytes). The distance between the ID number generated in the 
authentication and that must be stored in the enrollment stage 
is calculated as:  
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(8) 
Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the 224 samples of the 
genuine population and the 1792 samples of the impostor 
population versus such distance. The FAR and FRR are 
represented in Fig. 5. The dispersion of the genuine 
population is smaller than in the previous approach. Only 
several samples force to use a threshold of 0.61 MHz to 
achieve a FRR of zero. Even though, the FAR is zero. The 
proposed approach presents a security area of 0.61 MHz, 
among the genuine and false population. This represents a 
margin of 25.5% of the universe of discourse of the possible 
distances. Hence, it is possible not only to obtain a system 
with a FAR and FRR equal to zero by choosing a threshold in 
the range of 0.61 MHz to 1.22 MHz, but also if the threshold 
is selected with a value in the middle of this interval, it is 
possible to allow a variance of 0.305 MHz in both the genuine 
and the false populations while the FAR and FRR are still 
zero. This makes the authentication proposal robust against 
noise, temperature, and Vdd variations. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The new approach for hardware authentication based 
on RO PUFs improves the results of previously reported 
approaches because it achieves not only false acceptance rate 
(FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) of zero per cent but also 
enough error margin to be robust against noise, temperature, 
and Vdd variations. In addition, it requires a smaller number 
of ring oscillators, which means that authentication is 
performed with less power consumption and higher speed. 
All these advantages are obtained with no substantial 
increment in the size and complexity of the hardware 
required. This has been illustrated with experimental results 
from FPGAs from Xilinx. 
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Figure 4.  Genuine and impostor distribution in the proposed approach 
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Figure 5.  FAR and FRR in the proposed approach 
